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As Bhaskar (1989:1) argues, we need to take philosophy seriously because it
underwrites both what constitutes science and knowledge and which political
practices are deemed legitimate. At present, the field of educational research
internationally is witnessing a pragmatist trend, whereby practical education
research is carried out without reference to ontological and epistemological
concerns. For David Reynolds, a leading UK school effectiveness academic,
‘[p]recisely because we did not waste time on philosophical discussion or on
values debates, we made rapid progress’ (1998:20). Equally, for Teddlie, ‘[t]he
orientation of many in the US is to do rather than to reflect […] In reality
many practitioners are currently interested in what could work at their school
[…rather…] than in ruminations about social inequalities associated with
different socio-economic classes’ (Teddlie and Reynolds 2000:27). The purpose
of this chapter is not only to reclaim critical realist social philosophy for
educational research, but also to reclaim reality from the positivist and statistical
methodology that underpins School Effectiveness Research (SER) and to make
clear the difference that realism makes by virtue of its critical explanatory
power in unmasking the ideological nature of SER and its adoption by New
Labour.
Introduction
In commenting upon New Labour’s education policy, Gillborn and Youdell
(2000:31) point to its technicist and deeply regressive nature (see also, inter alia,
Angus 1993; Ball 1990; Gewirtz et al. 1995; Hill 1999; Morley and Rassool
1999; Scott 2000; Thrupp 1999; Willmott 1999a, 2000). They note that one of
Labour’s first ‘innovations’ was to establish within the Department for Education
and Employment (DfEE) the Standards and Effectiveness Unit. The title is
significant since the repetition of ‘standards’ underscores the continuity with
Conservative discourse, but the second part—the effectiveness part—is equally
important:
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 129
The unit’s head, Professor Michael Barber, is a leading writer on school
effectiveness and improvement, a prominent and growing school of work
that has attracted considerable controversy […] In particular, sociological
critics have attacked the naïve basis of many studies that seek to identify
(recipe-style) the elements that predispose a school towards being more or
less ‘effective’.
(Gillborn and Youdell 2000:32)
Indeed, SER has been strongly criticised for its ideological congruence with
New Labour’s consolidation of New Right education policies enacted in the
1980s and 1990s. Goldstein and Woodhouse’s (2000) recent contribution
represents one of a small number of attempts by SE researchers to deny or play
down the charge of ideological commitment and/or New Right association,
while at the same time recognising the limitations of some of the research within
the field itself. Such engagement with critics of school effectiveness is long
overdue and welcome. However, it is argued here that the counter-critique
remains fundamentally flawed. The charge of New Right ideological
commitment is reiterated. It is argued that the positivism of the Office for
Standards in Education (OFSTED), statistical modelling, the lack of theorising
within SER and the generic espousal of pragmatism resonate strongly with—
and contingently buttress—the individualist social ontology of neo-liberalism
that underpinned the quasi-marketisation and commodification of education in
England and Wales.1
Reynolds has admitted that ‘[s]chool effectiveness has sung the
policymakers’ tune in its emphasis upon how schools can make a difference—
indeed we wrote their words’ (1998:20). Yet, as Thrupp (2001) argues, nowhere
in the SE counter-critiques can be found examples of SE researchers not just
providing research support for, but actually implementing, the agendas of
neo-liberal/managerialist governments in various roles around the globe. He
notes that in the UK, for example, SER proponents are involved in developing,
promoting and evaluating New Labour’s educational reforms. Goldstein and
Woodhouse are also cognisant of the quasi-umbilical relationship with past
and present UK governments. In fact, they recommend that SER should
rename itself as Educational Effectiveness precisely in order to separate SE
research from government influence.
Furthermore, Teddlie et al. (2000:105–15) present growing reservations within
the SE community about the use of multi-level modelling because of, inter alia,
its excessive scientism, accompanied by a discussion of the modelling now
required. In short, they argue that, ultimately, the high hopes held for multi-
level modelling have not been realised. This is a welcome move away from
Mortimore and Sammons’ riposte to SE critics that ‘the use of MLM [multi-
level modelling] has enabled us to tease out the impact of a school on pupils
with quite different educational backgrounds and to make the case on their
behalf’ (1997:185). Indeed, they concluded then that ‘[m]ore complex models
are needed to reflect the complexity of the educational processes […] In general,
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we seek to use a range of quantitative and qualitative methods’ (1997:186–7).
What is conspicuously absent here is any discussion of modelling’s inherent
lack of explanatory power to account for the complexity of educational processes
and outcomes. There is no serious attempt to assess the extent to which statistical
modelling adequately represents the complexity of social reality. SE researchers
who adopt statistical methods do not ask what real objects and processes must
be like for mathematical representations of them to be adequate. The emphasis
on data—on how data are used, how much they should be used, how reliable
they are, and so on—detracts from any exploration of social ontology and
explanatory methodology. In other words, when problems are acknowledged,
there is no exploration of the conceptual and metaphysical problems implicit in
the use of statistics.
For Goldstein and Woodhouse, the issue is not about statistical modelling per
se but about how well it is used by SE researchers:
Statistical modelling, of course, is only as good as the data which it attempts to
model. It is also often the case that such models oversimplify reality to the
point of distorting it and producing misleading inferences. To point to specific
inadequacies, however, or to list inappropriate uses of such models does not
invalidate them per se. Statistical modelling of a complex kind can provide
insights, and unexpected relationships.
(2000:359)
This exemplifies my point about the primacy accorded to data, rather than to
social ontology and explanatory methodology.2 Goldstein and Woodhouse
comment that
the future health of SE research depends on a collective recognition by the
community that all is not well; that there is a clear need to come to
agreement on separating the good from the bad and that there is a need to
move onto a sounder methodological basis, which among other things,
will require the collection of different kinds of data. The SE community
would also do well to be more receptive and less defensive about its critics,
and to avoid the kinds of superficial responses we have discussed above.
Likewise, there is a need for some critics to demonstrate a deeper
understanding of SE research.
(2000:360)
Indeed, the authors are concerned about ‘the failure of the “qualitative” critics
properly to understand the nature of quantitative techniques’, which, they argue,
‘is quite serious since these critics do have valid points whose force is often
dissipated through lack of proper understandings of the nature and substance of
quantitative models’ (2000:359). The crucial issue here centres on the explanatory
utility of statistical modelling. The issue for critics like myself is that the use of
modelling as an aid to causal explanation is problematic since its language is
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 131
acausal and astructural. It is unable, among other things, to distinguish causal
from accidental relations. Indeed, the concept of Variable’, for example, is
indifferent vis-à-vis causal explanation: variables can only register change, not its
cause. The minute we start to ignore causal properties and powers it is easy to see
why New Labour’s educational policy-making can so readily argue for ‘zero
tolerance’, since prior conditioning by structural and cultural properties is erased
at a stroke (or held in abeyance).
This leads me to my final point. The neo-liberal restructuring of education
presupposes a social ontology that is unstructured and undifferentiated. The
argument for ideological commitment on the part of SE statisticians in particular
derives from the contingent compatibility between the secreted social ontology
of statistical methods and the atomistic social ontology of neo-liberalism. Let’s
be clear here: I am not suggesting that statistical modelling necessarily entails
neo-liberalism. The argument is that the inability of statistics to distinguish
between contingent and necessary relations and thus to incorporate the stratified
nature of social reality resonates with the social ontology of neoliberalism. As
Sayer puts it:
The blindness of mathematics to internal relations and emergence encourages
[…] the belief that complex actions can be treated as reducible to some simple
combination of simple behaviours which in turn are regular responses to set
stimuli, as if each stimulus and action had the same meaning regardless of
context.
(1992:200)
Sayer’s argument is that individualistic theories that portray society as a
structureless aggregate of externally related individuals resonates more easily
with the use of quantitative methods. Thus Goldstein and Woodhouse are correct
to argue that statistical models ‘certainly have no inbuilt requirement for any
particular managerial structure’ (2000:355), but they cannot see that they resonate
strongly with the neo-liberal restructuring of education. The relationship is one
of contingent compatibility, not necessary concomitance, between statistical
methods and the New Managerialist/neo-liberal restructuring of education in
England and Wales.
To be fair, Goldstein and Woodhouse are aware of the ideological usurpation
of SE research by past Conservative and New Labour administrations.
However, they do not accept the charge of New Right association. While
their recognition of the role played by SER in New Labour’s education policy
is welcome, it is important to reiterate the charge of right-wing ideological
commitment. New Labour’s modernisation project; the growing emphasis
upon ‘what works’; the lack of theorising within SER; statistical modeling—
all share the same social ontological bed, which denies the irreducibility of
society to individuals. What Goldstein and Woodhouse have yet to
acknowledge is that statistical modelling’s implicit social ontology renders it
susceptible to right-wing appropriation.
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New Labour, New Right: the case of education
As Powell notes, it is possible ‘to point to a number of areas where New
Labour exhibits a large degree of policy continuity with the Conservatives,
or is even going beyond the Conservatives’ (1999:284). In the case of
education, for many commentators New Right consolidation has occurred.
The support that derives from SE research for neo-liberal and managerialist
policies has been widely noted (Angus 1993; Dale 1992; Whitty et al. 1998;
Lauder et al. 1998; Olssen 2000; Thrupp 1999; Willmott 1999b). However,
the extent to which there is isomorphism between the New Right and New
Labour is contested. As Clarke et al. (2000) note, much effort has already
been spent on trying to identify the distinctive political configuration of New
Labour, which has been dominated by questions of difference and continuity
in relation to ‘Old Labour’ (or social democracy) and to the New Right (or
Thatcherism and neoliberalism). However, in the case of education I would
argue that there is isomorphism. As Morley and Rassool (1999) point out,
while New Labour has reinserted the concept of disadvantage via the creation
of Education Action Zones, the implicit assumption remains that such schools
can perform independently of contextual constraints. This is consistent with
the atomistic social ontology of OFSTED, much of the SE literature, and
neo-liberalism, which in turn provides ideological legitimation for New
Managerialism in education and concomitant work intensification.
As Fergusson succinctly puts it:
On the face of it, New Labour in education, as in other spheres, has adopted
wholesale most of the premises of neoliberalism, many of its objectives, and
almost all of its methods of delivering them. Competition, choice and
performance indicators remain the unchallenged totems of policy, not in
overt policy statements but simply by being left unchallenged by New Labour
reforms. Structurally, little that is fundamental is changing in the ways in
which schools and colleges are run. Markets and managerialism hold sway
[…] Only the rhetoric of what schools and colleges can and should produce
changes […] The point of difference [between New Right and New Labour]
is not whether schools should be better, but which ones should be made
better first.
(2000:203)
I would add here that the imposition of baseline assessment and national targets
represent an extension of neo-liberalism. Furthermore, Fergusson notes that New
Labour’s commitment to modernisation includes a supplementary set of priorities,
namely the drive towards inclusionary policies, the idea of stake-holding and
efforts to secure democratic renewal, which ‘all assign a new priority to the social
consequences of modernization, so long as they are accompanied by risk sharing
and responsibilization’ (2000:205). Inclusion here means adopting middle-class
values and practices within an individualist and competitive framework. Equally,
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 133
‘responsibilization’ is individualist. As Fergusson rightly argues, parents are made
implicitly responsible for their children’s education, ‘as the new discourse shifted
the boundaries of where the state’s responsibilities stopped, and parents’ began’
(2000:209).
Freeden (1999:44) argues that the ideological amalgam of New Labour includes
liberal, conservative and socialist components as well as ideational additions from
the US. For him, New Labour ideology is not identical with any one of the latter
categories. He rightly argues that ideologies do not have to be grand narratives
nor closed, doctrinaire and abstract systems. It would be useful here analytically
to distinguish between ideas (or what Archer (1995) calls the ‘Cultural System’)
and what people do with them (at the level of socio-cultural interaction). Ideas
remain ideas until used or activated by social actors: it is the social use of specific
ideas that may (or may not) be ideological. By analytically separating out ideas
and their use, one can account for the contradictions that exemplify New Labour
(and past Conservative) social policy. Thus, for example, while in the abstract
(cultural systemic level) neo-liberal ideas disclaim the stratified nature of social
reality, practically (at the sociocultural level) actual markets require institutions
and organisations that are irreducible to individuals, as we shall see. Indeed,
quintessential to New Right discourse is the out-and-out denigration of
bureaucracy. As advocates of entrepreneurial governance often appear incapable
of conceptualising public bureaux in anything other than negative terms, they
cannot imagine what sort of positive role those bureaux might be performing’
(DuGay 2000:67). The point here is that while bureaucracy may be inefficient
and inhibit innovation it cannot be avoided. Both private and public organisations
need a significant degree of bureaucratisation if they are to cope with large
throughputs of information and material.
Ideology, Hayek and the nature of ‘the market’
As Bhaskar (1989:87) argues, designating a set of ideas as ‘ideology’ is only
justified if they can be explained as well as criticised, which involves being able to
say why the ideas or beliefs concerned are false. This section provides the backdrop
to the widespread acceptance of neo-liberal ideas, as propounded in particular by
Hayek. It also provides an explanation of the falsity of neo-liberalism via
transcendental argumentation. The ideology of the ‘free’ market is laid bare; this
in turn enables the charge of ideological commitment against SER proponents
developed in the next section, for the positivist impulse of the latter is contingently
congruent: both positivism and neo-liberalism are transcendentally false and
ideological.
Jonathan (1997) has argued convincingly that the populist appeal of the ‘New
Right’ agenda for restructuring—or the quasi-marketisation of—education stems
from the liberal promises of equality that were made following the 1944 Butler
Act. She argues that recent New Right attacks on education tapped a reservoir of
popular unease. Such unease was not unsurprising since, ‘despite reformist
measures over three decades, the post-war education project of individual
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emancipation for each and simultaneous social progress for all had failed to deliver
to many what they had hoped for from it’ (Jonathan 1997:57). Indeed, it was the
failure of Keynesian social democracy that resonated well with ‘liberal’ thinking
that dates back further than the oil crisis. I have deliberately placed scare quotes
around liberal, since neo-liberalism, while anchored in eighteenth-and nineteenth-
century premisses about the danger of well-intentioned paternalism leading to
authoritarian coercion, fails to engage with unresolved questions about the
interdependence of agency in the social world. Thus, to Jonathan,
nineteenth-century liberal niceties about the relation of the individual to the
social are conspicuous by their absence in the pronouncements not only of
politicians of New Right persuasion […] but also in some philosophical writing
and in the exhortations of ‘opinion-formers’ in right-wing ‘think-tanks’. The
claim that neo-liberalism represents the eclipse of politics by economics may
seem superficially surprising when apologists are typically keen to adopt the
mantle and invoke the authority of the early liberals, but that invocation is
seriously misleading
(1997:48–9)
Part of the systematisation of the ‘New Right’ philosophy places a premium on a
(potentially rewarding) search for congruent ideational items. Hence the selective
use of ideational items from Mill, Hume, Smith et al. during the 1980s by such
organisations as the Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute and the
Institute for Economic Affairs. The Centre for Policy Studies was founded by
Margaret Thatcher and Keith Joseph and quickly became a focus for the ideas of
such right-wing thinkers as Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek. The underlying
theme for the ideas systematised by sections of the New Right was the alleged
superiority of market mechanisms and the need for sound money. Such cultural
embroidery was carried out against the backdrop of the Black Papers, of which
the last was published in 1977.
[Henceforth] the discursive cudgels of the conservative educational offensive
were taken up by a variety of related and overlapping New Right agencies
and groups […] What makes them markedly different from the rather
informally produced Black Papers is the degree and sophistication of their
organisation and strategies for dissemination […] By the 1980s […] neo-
liberal texts, particularly the work of Hayek, and monetarist theories like
those of Friedman, are paraded as a basis for social and economic policy
making.
(Ball 1990:34–5)
However, as Gamble (1988) notes, the call for the restoration of sound money
has been the New Right’s centrepiece and is the issue on which the New Right
first made a major impact. Despite continuing disagreement about the nature of
the economy, the widening of divisions between competing macro-economic
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 135
perspectives and the undermining of the theoretical underpinnings of monetarism,
it was the marked deterioration in economic performance of the 1970s that accounts
for the New Right’s ascendancy. Monetarists argue, inter alia, that the control of
inflation should be prioritised, irrespective of any increase in unemployment.
New Right economics decries state intervention because it is held that
administrative and bureaucratic structures are inherently inferior to markets as a
means of allocating resources. With regard to public expenditure and taxation,
New Right economists assert that market solutions would in every case be superior
to the established public provision. At the same time, there evolved the contribution
of ‘public choice theory’, which argued against the notion that public bodies are
disinterested and enlightened, while putting forward the view that private
individuals and companies are self-interested and avaricious. The argument here
is that the pursuit of self-interest by private bodies is licensed by the existence of
a competitive framework of rules that does not exist in the public sector.
Consequently, many in the New Right concluded that ‘markets were much
superior to democracy in representing and aggregating individual choices. It was
only a short step to arguing that democracy needed to be hedged around with
restrictions to ensure that it did not permit encroachments upon the private sphere’
(Gamble 1988:52).
Hayek’s catallaxy: the denial of social structure
The key thinker of the neo-liberals is Hayek. The term ‘neo-liberalism’—as has
occurred with the generic ‘New Right’—is employed as a portmanteau, which
embraces Friedman’s economic liberalism, Nozick’s libertarianism (the advocacy
of the minimal state) and Hayek’s Austrian economics. Hayek lends support to
the sui generis properties of the division of labour. He distinguishes between
‘catallaxy’ and ‘economy’. His conception of economy is a restricted one, referring
to clusters of economic activities that are organised for a specific purpose and
have a unitary hierarchy of ends, in which knowledge of how to achieve ends is
shared. A catallaxy, on the other hand, has no unitary hierarchy of ends, but a
mass of innumerable economies without a specific purpose. As Hayek has
famously pointed out, it is the product of spontaneous growth as opposed to
design. One of Hayek’s central arguments, contra state socialism, is that the
catallaxy eludes regulation by central control. This is because of the
extraordinary division of knowledge immanent in any advanced industrial
economy. Thus the fundamental economic problem is not calculational but
epistemological; namely, how to coordinate the actions of innumerable agents
without the possibility of any adequate centralised knowledge of their needs
and resources. Consequently, competition operates as a discovery procedure
and the main role of markets is in generating information through the price
mechanism as to how economic agents ignorant of each other may best attain
their equally unknown purposes (Sayer 1995).
The salient point, then, is that the complex and evolutionary nature of the
catallaxy renders its qualities unknowable to any single mind or organisation.
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Hayek correctly takes to task the socialist vision of a collectively controlled and
planned advanced economy—a ‘fatal conceit’, which he terms ‘constructivism’.
As Sayer (1995) points out, many Marxist positions have failed to acknowledge
the fundamental difference between running a technical division of labour for
producing a particular type of commodity and coordinating a social division of
labour involving millions of different commodities, thousands of enterprises and
billions of customers. This is not to license chaos, for although catallaxies are
unplanned they are ordered. Yet, for Marx, the only good order ‘must be the
product of conscious collective purpose, a Hegelian legacy of humanity rising to
consciousness and control over itself […] Marx is resistant not only to actions
having bad unintended consequences, but to unintended consequences per se’
(Sayer 1995:76). However, Hayek adopts the extreme counter-position to Marx.
In brief, he reasons that because unintended consequences of actions are central
to the functioning of catallaxies, one must not intervene. This is simply a non
sequitur and, inter alia, excuses problems that can—and should—be confronted
and assessed in the search for feasible alternatives. More crucially, Hayek denies
that catallaxies possess emergent properties:
Absent from Hayek’s image of capitalism as an unimaginably complex
mass of individuals responding to one another through markets is any
notion of major social structures […] While modern societies and advanced
economies are indeed catallaxies, they are also systems with grand
structures.
(Sayer 1995:77–8)
It is therefore unsurprising that the ontological erasure of relatively enduring
social structures leads to an emphasis on ‘the market’ as a sphere of freedom. Yet
a market encompasses not simply commodity exchanges and associated transfers
of money, but also enduring organised practices that facilitate such exchanges on
a regular basis. It is worth briefly discussing the different types of market and the
multiple meanings of ‘market’.
The nature of ‘the market’
Essentially, makets differ according to the way in which transactions are organised,
particularly with regard to pricing. ‘Spot markets’ are those in which prices are
flexible and relationships between actors ephemeral. Spot markets approximate
economic models. Yet most real markets do not fit this type of market. Instead,
fixed prices provide a stable environment for calculating costs and organising
production and distribution. Economic models tend to assume the universality
of ‘arm’s-length contracting’, whereby little information other than price is provided
and buyer-supplier relationships are minimal. ‘Relational contracting’, by contrast,
involves the sharing of information, the careful building of trust and collaboration
between buyer and seller, before and after the transaction. However, neo-liberals
wrongly contend that markets work best ‘on the spot’, at arm’s length, and thus
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 137
discourage information sharing. Hayek et al. overestimate the sufficiency of price
as a source of information for buyers and sellers in markets. Prior to commodity
exchange, non-price information normally has to be exchanged and is usually
provided at no extra cost to the buyer.
The New Right is well known for its trumpeting of the ‘free’ market, in which
all that exists (or, rather, matters) are spontaneous exchanges between individuals
who have something to sell. The operation of the state is thus regarded as disrupting
this smooth-running, spontaneous gathering of free individuals. ‘Yet far from
being an unnecessary interference, the state is a normal feature of real markets,
as a precondition of their existence. Markets depend on the state for regulation,
protection of property rights, and the currency’ (Sayer 1995:87). We will return
to the subject of state regulation in more detail shortly. Suffice it to say, markets
are not ‘free’, since their regulation does not benefit all. There are enduring
structured power imbalances. However, Sayer points out that the conceptual slides
endemic to employment of ‘the market’ are a feature of both lay and academic
uses and are found in right/left-wing, liberal and economic theory. The Right
proffer idealised models of markets as descriptions of de facto markets; the Left
avoids any rigorous scrutiny of their properties. Sayer argues that concepts of
markets differ according to: (a) their level of abstraction; (b) their inclusiveness;
(c) whether they are couched within a ‘market optic’ or a ‘production optic’; and
(d) whether they refer to real or imaginary markets.
Real markets may be conceptualised at different levels of abstraction. One
can talk about the local fruit-and-vegetable market concretely (who the sellers
and buyers are, what is sold, and so on) or more abstractly, that is, in terms of
the exchange of commodities and property rights for money or as a mode of
coordination of the division of labour. At the same time, concepts of markets
also differ in inclusiveness. Markets may be defined narrowly in terms of
routinised buying and selling, or inclusively to cover the production and
consumption of exchanged goods and the particular property relations involved.
Restricted concepts exclude major contextual influences that explain behaviour.
As Sayer puts it, ‘[t]he dynamism of capitalist economies is not simply a
consequence of markets in the restricted sense, but of capital, obliged to
accumulate in order to survive, and liberated from the ties which bind petty
commodity producers’ (1995:99). What is included on the Left is determined
by a ‘production optic’, in which markets are marginalised. For the Right, what
is included is determined by a ‘market optic’, whereby production is conflated
with exchange. For our purposes, we are concerned with the ‘market optic’ of
the Right. The market optic ignores production and its social relations. Indeed,
in mainstream economics, the whole economy becomes the market (in the
singular) and almost invariably counterposed to the state. The salient point
here is that markets are not an alternative to production, firms or hierarchies
(Sayer 1995:101); rather, they are a mode of coordination of the division of
labour.
Furthermore, one can distinguish literal concepts that refer to real markets
from those that refer to imaginary ones, and also from those that use market
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metaphors that have limited similarity to real markets. As Sayer argues, it is not
the level of abstraction used in metaphorical approaches that is important; rather,
it is their quality. Indeed, what is often lost is the social relations that underpin
real markets.
The transcendental argument
Transcendentally, the neo-liberal social ontology cannot be sustained: market
exchange requires state involvement. The corollary is that the existence of schooling
is equally necessary. Given that the market is not ‘free’, and is necessarily subject
to some form of institutional regulation, then
deregulated governance of education loses its justification, and the [neo-liberal]
project loses its rationale even on its own terms […] If this line of reasoning
can be sustained when elaborated, it would provide a transcendental argument
against the existence of principles of free-market exchange in the governance
and distribution of education […] Furthermore, if neo-liberal principles can be
shown to be incompatible with the governance of that social practice without
whose alignment no vision for the ordering of society can be realised, then the
vision itself is called into question, not only on grounds of equity […] but on
grounds of coherence.
(Jonathan 1997:25–6)
There are two distinct issues to consider here. Firstly, there is the transcendental
argument that markets—or Hayek’s catallaxy—are regulated by institutions that
are irreducible to individuals. Secondly, there is Jonathan’s argument that the
very institutions that underpin market relationships themselves require an
educated workforce, in turn negating the neo-liberal project of subjecting the
education system to market disciplinary mechanisms. Put simply, the rationale
behind the neoliberal marketisation of the education system ultimately precludes
the possibility of market activity. Moreover, neo-liberals themselves are unable
to avoid the fact that the education system is state run and did not appear out
of thin air. The argument for reconcilability is centred on the short-term need
for the state to establish the conditions for a market-based education system.
Yet the fact that the state has to regulate belies the neo-liberals’ atomistic social
ontology that is central to the argument for state non-intervention. The fact
that the neo-liberal elements of the 1988 Education Reform Act deny the need
for state intervention has serious implications for headteachers and their staff
in terms of what is to be taught, how it is to be taught and under what conditions
of service (inter alia demanding more for less as schools become subject to the
discipline of quasi-market mechanisms).
Crucially, however, the devolution of control to individual schools
contradicted the neo-liberal corpus since such devolution was done at the behest
of central government. Any argument which claims that such centralised control
was intended to be ephemeral, a necessary prelude to complete deregulation,
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 139
simply conceals the contradiction: the need for state control remains while we
have an education system. The Hayekian approach disclaims the need for any
form of planning, partly because of its state socialist connotations. Consequently,
Local Education Authority (LEA) plans for limiting the number of children per
school were dismissed out of hand and instead replaced by Local Management
of Schools (LMS) funding arrangements, whereby schools were funded on a
per capita basis and empowered to recruit as many pupils as practicable via
open enrolment. But markets can never be a complete alternative to planning
and hierarchy. The Hillgate Group’s idea of providing vouchers for parents, if
implemented on a wide scale, would itself have required significant planning.
Moreover, such planning would have been expensive and not as efficient as the
LEA system.
Statistical methods, positivism and ideological
commitment
The above section has provided the transcendental grounds for the claim that the
neo-liberal rationale behind the quasi-marketisation of the education system is
untenable. In so doing, it has also elaborated the variety of definitions of ‘the
market’ and how the ‘market optic’ of the neo-liberals denies the irreducibility of
social structure. The charge of ideological commitment derives from the
concealment of the transcendental necessity of sui generis structures that delimit
agential action. In other words, the implicit denial of structural properties enables
SER proponents and New Labour to assume that all schools can perform well
independently of contextual constraints, in turn creating the work overload and
stress that has been reported among the teaching profession. As Scott puts it,
‘[w]hat is at issue in short is that a method from within a positivist/empiricist
framework […] cannot help but provide support for an agenda which emphasizes
control, prediction and the rejection of a holistic view of education’ (2000:70).
The argument of this section is that the statistical methods and the generic
positivism of SER lend themselves to individualistic social philosophies and
policies. Indeed, as Thrupp (2001) rightly argues, critics of SER are not concerned
with the technical issues in statistical modelling: the issue is whether modelling is
able to capture the school processes it is expected to measure. The fact that
modelling lacks explanatory power and cannot measure such processes should
encourage SE statisticians and users of such statistics to reassess their role as
educational researchers and reflect upon the untrammelled ease with which New
Right policies appropriate their findings.
As we have seen in the introduction, Goldstein and Woodhouse are concerned
about the failure of some critics to understand fully the nature of quantitative
techniques. They argue that the power of multi-level modelling can only be realized
once ‘quality’ data have been obtained. Yet we are not told which data and why?
The debate is (again) played out at the level of methodology. SE researchers need
to move beyond the level of methodology and engage with the priority of ontology
Any methodology presupposes a social ontology, implicitly or explicitly. Thrupp
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(2001) notes that ‘SER’s generally offhand approach to its critics may be especially
unfortunate if proponents and critics of SER are often talking past each other as
a result of different epistemological commitments as Willmott (1999) has argued’.
This is indubitable. However, the principal argument of my article concerned
ontology, that is, the secreted social ontology of positivist/statistical methods and
its contingent congruence with neo-liberalism.
For Goldstein and Woodhouse, however,
Perhaps the most extreme criticism of the use of [mathematical] models comes
from Willmott, who mounts a general attack on ‘positivism’. The difficulty
with this critique is that it is very difficult to recognize any real researchers as
practising positivists—at least according to Willmott’s definition. For example,
he asserts that positivism is unable to take account of subtle variations of
social relationships within institutions over time, yet there are many studies
which do model changing relationships of various kinds over time—the main
problem being with the availability of the data rather than with the technical
procedures required to do the modelling.
(2000:359)
The last comment is instructive, since the authors remain firmly wedded to
mathematical modelling. They do not acknowledge that precisely because
they remain wedded to mathematical modelling they are positivists:
mathematical modelling cannot take account of subtle variations of social
relationships over time. But let’s be clear about what we mean by positivism.
Positivism is a theory of the nature and limits of knowledge. Bhaskar describes
it as follows:
Particular knowledge is of events sensed in perception; general knowledge is
of the patterns such events show in space and over time, which, if it is to be
possible, must be constant […] Sense-perception exhausts the possible objects of
knowledge […] Positivism is a theory of knowledge. But any theory of knowledge
presupposes an ontology […] Thus the Humean theory, which forms the lynchpin
of the positivist system, presupposes an ontology of closed systems and atomistic
events […] Moreover any theory of knowledge presupposes a sociology in the
sense that it must be assumed, implicitly if not explicitly, that the nature of
human beings and the institutions they reproduce or transform is such that
such knowledge could be produced. Thus the Humean theory presupposes a
conception of people as passive sensors of given facts and recorders of their
given constant conjunctions, which has the corollary that knowledge can always
be analysed in a purely individualistic way.
(1989:49–50)
Bhaskar then argues that it is in the resulting inconsistent system that positivism’s
tremendous versatility and flexibility as an ideology lies. It functions as an ideology
for social practices other than science ‘by encouraging, by injunction or resonance,
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certain substantive conceptions of the nature of nature, society, persons and their
interconnections’ (1989:50).
Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, Goldstein and Woodhouse want to
incorporate—inconsistently—the fact that schools function within a social and
political system, and at the same time retain the primacy of statistical modelling.
Ultimately, then, this means that they cannot avoid the denial of social reality
qua structured and open system that is intrinsic to mathematical modelling. In
brief, there are two conditions that must be met for a closed system to exist.
Firstly, there is the intrinsic condition for closure; that is, there must be no
change or qualitative variation in the object possessing causal powers if
mechanisms are to operate consistently. Secondly, the relationship between the
causal mechanism and those of its external conditions must be constant if the
outcome is to be regular (the extrinsic condition for closure). As Sayer (1992)
points out, the intrinsic condition for closure is ignored even if the extrinsic one
is acknowledged. Moreover,
[t]he presence of uninterpreted constants, parameters or coefficients in many
models bears witness to the inadequacy of their attempts to produce a
correspondence between mathematical and causal order. If they cannot be
interpreted as ‘standing for’ a particular process or characteristic they may
more justifiably be described as ‘fudge factors’ in that their only function is to
conceal the inadequacies of the model by providing a means of fitting it to any
data set. (With enough parameters, any model can be fitted to any data.) […]
Modellers may not be aware of it, but the inclusion of parameters whose
values vary from case to case provides a retrospective but uninterpretable way
of allowing for the non-satisfaction of the intrinsic and extrinsic conditions for
closure and the mis-specification of causal structure.
(Sayer 1992:184–5)
The transcendentally false assumption that social reality is a closed system is
congruent with the OFSTED inspection regime, which is underpinned by SER.
OFSTED assumes that learning outcomes can be linked directly and
unambiguously to inputs (viz. teaching). Indeed, the tacit OFSTED assumption
here is that causal factors are independent, universal and additive; that is, they do
not interfere with each other and are uninfluenced by their contexts. The
ideological import is palpable: teachers are blamed for pupil ‘failure’ (in other
words, poor examination results). Furthermore, the key determinants (later
reworked as key ‘factors’) that in OFSTED’s view constitute ‘effective’ schools
are culled at the level of observable events and in positivist fashion there is no
attempt to differentiate between contingency and necessity Indeed, the (eleven)
factors are viewed as correlates of effective schools. The idea that there may be a
contingent relation between successful learning and strong leadership cannot be
entertained. Here, then, we return to the perennial problem of spurious correlations
that haunts the use of statistics because of its inability to distinguish accidental
from necessary relations. Thus, for Hopkins, ‘[t]he so-called “effectiveness
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correlates” however sophisticatedly defined are no substitute for models or theories
of how schools function. Without this knowledge it is difficult to see how the
[SE] field can progress’ (1996:30).
Again, the main problem is that statistical modelling cannot deal with
components that are not qualitatively invariant (for example, children and teachers)
or where they interact causally with one another, or where emergent powers rise
or are dissolved through combinations and separations. As Sayer succinctly puts
it, ‘[a]ttempting to explain the effects of an object which has emergent powers in
terms of the relative contribution of its constituents is like attributing a certain
percentage of behaviour of water to hydrogen effects and the rest to oxygen
effects!’ (1992:181). Thus, we would not explain why students attend lectures in
terms of attributing a certain percentage of their behaviour to lecturer effects and
the rest to student effects. Instead, we employ such explanatory concepts as social
structure—in this case, the irreducible emergent structural property of lecturer/
student together with its wider structural embedding (university, polity and
economy, and the necessary irreducible relations between them). We can count
how many students turn up to lectures, but this does not tell us why. Similarly,
SER may tell us how many students from working-class backgrounds gain A*-C
GCSE passes but it does not tell us how and why. And although SER may also
tell us that certain schools achieve better results for their working-class students,
thereby indicating their ‘value-addedness’, it does not tell us why. This explains
why such results become so easily appropriated by New Right government(s),
since it is a short step to argue that all schools can achieve high levels of attainment,
irrespective of social background. Without adequate explanation (or even attempts
at explanation), SE data are ever open to political manipulation. One might
reasonably expect an exploration of the material limits to the crude indicators of
effectiveness currently imposed. Statistical techniques do not exist in abstract
isolation: the socio-political context must always be taken into account, theoretically
and ethically—and not as a mere afterthought exemplified by the belated recognition
of the importance of social class, which is then statistically controlled for (Willmott
1999b).
Ironically, as Goldstein and Woodhouse call for more sophisticated models
and ‘data’, Sayer (1992) argues that the value of statistics is depreciated as our
knowledge of causal mechanisms becomes more complete. However, he does
argue that the usefulness of statistical methods depends crucially upon the type
of objects to which they are applied and the type of research design in which
they are employed. In a nutshell, an evaluation of the possibilities of statistical
analysis requires a non-statistical examination of the objects of interest: such an
examination is conspicuously absent in the existing SE research concerned
with mathematical modelling. A common criticism of statistical analyses of
relationships among variables is that they tend to abstract from qualitative change
in their key objects and from changes in context; often the two are linked and
internally related (Sayer 1992:198). By way of an example, Sayer cites industrial
change as an area of study in which students have for many years abstracted
from the continually changing interdependence between the qualitative nature
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 143
of particular industries and the competitive environment in which they operate,
as if the external variables were only externally related and as if the economic
environment were just a passive backcloth to the action. This type of analysis
has also characterised SE and School Improvement (SI) research. As Goldstein
and Woodhouse note:
Schools function within a social and political system which has its own
structures and processes, whether these be one of inter-school competition
or those determined by externally imposed constraints of curriculum or
resource. Despite the recognition of this by many within SE and SI […]
there seems little in the research itself that seriously attempts to address this
problem. While SE research has gone some way towards modelling
withinschool complexities, it has made almost no attempt to contextualise
schools within the wider environment. To do so, of course, would involve
political as well as social and cultural considerations and it is doubtful whether
this would be welcome to government.
(2000:356)
Here we have, on the one hand, a welcome discussion of the importance of the
structures and processes that shape what goes on in schools and the recognition
of the government’s likely disapprobation of research that incorporates the latter,
yet, on the other hand, the need for contextualisation is reductively couched in
terms of modelling. There is a crucial recognition of the need to contextualise the
environment in which schools function, yet immediately we are returned to the
familiar territory of mathematical modelling. There is no discussion of the
materiality of political and social systems, and of the necessary internal relation
between schools, the state and the economy, and how the economy cannot sensibly
be statistically represented. Statistically minded SE researchers should take on
board the fact that mathematical models assume a closed system (see above).
People and their social environments are not externally related and susceptible to
treatment as Variables’.
Finally, I wish to reiterate the contingent relationship that exists between
statistical methods and the New Right in the context of education. As I have
already argued, Goldstein and Woodhouse are quite right to insist that statistical
methods have no in-built requirement for a particular managerial structure.
However, such methods do not exist in abstract isolation. As Thrupp (2001)
rightly notes, the in-house concerns of SE proponents do not run as deep as those
of their critics because they see the problem mostly as a matter of encouraging a
more satisfactory use of their findings by politicians rather than acknowledging
the current managerialist climate. Goldstein and Woodhouse argue that much of
what we know about the effects of class is derived from careful statistical modelling.
Yet the crucial point is that ‘careful statistical modelling’ can never explain what
is registered statistically. One must be careful not to elide explanation and effects.
Indeed, it must be remembered that managerialist structures have been imposed
and underpinned by the quantitative data supplied by SE researchers. Providing
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statistical ‘evidence’ of the effects of class does not tell us whether class itself
places limits on educational achievement. An examination of this question should
involve rigorous analysis of the nature, dynamics and causal properties of class.
This is why the atheoretical nature of statistics readily lends itself to neo-liberal
appropriation. While Goldstein and Woodhouse et al. explicitly discuss the issue
of class, statistical methods cannot adequately incorporate it and thus any statistical
findings should only be used as a tentative starting point.3
Lack of theorising within the SE movement
SE research has long been taken to task for lacking a theoretical base; indeed,
this criticism is now accepted by SE proponents. Lauder et al. (1998) rightly
point out that the early SE literature was predicated upon notions of ethos
and climate in order to lay claim to a ‘theoretical’ basis for its research.
Goldstein and Woodhouse acknowledge this point; however, instructively
they also argue that
[i]t is not incumbent upon every research endeavour to provide a strong
theoretical basis of the kind that allows interesting predictions and shapes our
interpretation of the world being studied. There is, for example, often an
important period during which empirical evidence needs to be accumulated
before coherent theories can be developed. Naturally, such empirical
accumulation makes particular theoretical assumptions about the phenomena
it studies, but these can be general ones already in use rather than specific
ones that attach exclusively to the particular field of enquiry […] The choice
of framework will itself determine the nature of any inferences which are
drawn, and different frameworks can lead to real or apparent conflicts. It is
important to appreciate this, since there is a notable lack in the current school
effectiveness literature of serious attempts to expose underlying assumptions
that the research is making.
(2000:360)
The above is contradictory and confusing. Firstly, Goldstein and Woodhouse
conceive of theory, in positivist fashion, in terms of prediction. For predictions
give us grounds for expecting something to happen, while causal explanations
tell us what makes things happen. Crucially, causal explanations can only serve
as grounds for reliable predictions under special conditions—and such conditions
are not generally found in social science. For social realists theory is about (fallible)
explanation of matters social. Prediction and explanation are mutually exclusive:
there is no ‘middle ground’.
Secondly, the authors argue that it is not incumbent upon every researcher to
provide a strong theoretical basis yet acknowledge at the same time that empirical
accumulation makes particular theoretical assumptions. The logic is far from
impeccable here. I would suggest that the tension above derives from the
atheoretical nature of statistics, whose non-explanatory make-up resonates with
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School effectiveness and ideological commitment 145
individualist theories, which Goldstein and Woodhouse want to avoid. However,
it is argued, rightly, that the choice of framework determines the nature of any
inferences that are drawn. In other words, while in any field of study the nature
of what exists cannot be unrelated to how it is studied, what is held to exist
shapes considerations about how it should be explained. As Archer (1998) rightly
argues, social ontology plays a regulative role vis-à-vis the explanatory methodology
for the reason that it conceptualises social reality in certain terms. Conversely,
regulation is mutual, since what is held to exist cannot remain immune from
what does exist. As Archer puts it,’[s]uch consistency is a general requirement
and it usually requires continuous two-way adjustment between ontology and
methodology to achieve and sustain it as such’ (1998:17). In the case of Goldstein
and Woodhouse, the nature of social reality has led to a re-examination of previous
assumptions, in particular the incorporation of social class and the
acknowledgement of socio-political systems. However, the fact remains that
statistical methods retain their primacy, thereby undercutting the ontological basis
of the (belated) incorporation of social class.
Archer (1998) argues that the constituent elements of social theorising are
threefold, that none is dispensable and that each exerts a regulatory role on the
other, as follows:
social ontology ! explanatory methodology ! practical social theory
Statistical methods and modelling dispense with all three elements, yet in practice
they cannot avoid making implicit ontological assumptions. However, this does
not mean that any social ontology can be added on: precisely because statistical
methods cannot deal in any meaningful sense with the stratified nature of social
reality means that individualistic theories or ontological underpinnings are its
‘natural’ territory. SE statisticians need to recognise the severe explanatory limits
of their tools and to put their sociopolitical (ontological) cards on the table, so to
speak.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has reiterated the charge of ideological commitment against SE
statisticians. The warrant to do so derives from the contingent compatibility
between the unstructured, flat social ontology of neo-liberalism, which
underpinned the restructuring of education in England and Wales, and the inability
of statistical methods to acknowledge the stratified nature of social reality. It is
because SE statisticians continue to deny the charge of association with the New
Right that considerable time has been devoted to spelling out the nature of neo-
liberalism, its transcendental untenability and the transcendental social realist
alternative of ontological stratification. It is indeed welcome that SE mathematical
modellers are attempting to distance themselves from government influence.
However, they have yet to acknowledge the fact that statistical data are derived
from sociopolitical contexts that their models cannot explain, which in turn makes
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the data susceptible to abuse by government. I would suggest that the primacy
given to modelling and statistics in some SER quarters be greatly attenuated in
favour of theorising about the nature of schooling and society and, concomitantly,
the material limits to ‘improvement’.
Notes
1 It is important to explain the realist social ontology adopted in this chapter at the
outset, for it provides the basis for the charge of ideological commitment made against
neo-liberalism and SER. In brief, transcendental realism is committed to what social
reality must be like in order to make analysis of it intelligible. In other words, it
makes claims as to its necessary conditions that make it a possible object of knowledge.
Transcendental social realism does not make claims as to which structures constitute
social reality, but that it is structured, that is possesses sui generis enduring relations.
The unobservable nature of irreducible social relations (for example, between teacher
and pupil) lies at the heart of the realist conception of social structure. Structure is
viewed neither as an aggregate of individuals nor as an observable regular pattern of
events. It is not held to be independent of agency; rather, it is maintained that structure
is an emergent property that is sui generis real by virtue of its relational nature. A
teacher presupposes a pupil (or pupils), a head presupposes teachers, a governing
body presupposes teachers, pupils, heads and administrative staff, and so on. Thus,
we are talking about internal relations between roles, which are ontologically distinct
from the individual people who fill them and whom they causally affect. The teacher-
pupil internal necessary relation is an irreducible emergent property because the
powers deposited within the roles modify the powers of the individuals as individuals.
A lecturer cannot self-award a first-class honours degree just as a student cannot
revoke the decision of a degree classification board: such powers do not reside in the
properties of individuals but reside in the social relations that presuppose such
individuals for their enduring efficacy (and hence mediation) (Willmott 1999a).
2 This applies equally to Mortimore and Sammons, who, in a response to charges of
ideological commitment, have argued: ‘[h]ow can anyone who understands research
methodology […] make such an unfair accusation?’ (1997:185). What such SER
exponents consistently eschew is an exploration and/or defence of the implicit social
ontology that ineluctably underpins their methodological commitments. See Willmott
(1999b) for a fuller discussion.
3 In relation to social background and educational performance, Sayer notes that one
may be tempted to interpret the subject from the start as involving questions about
possible generalisations and quantifiable formal relations:
‘How does educational performance vary with social background?’ As soon as this
question is posed in this way we tend to opt without further ado for a quantitative
analysis. From then, the next major decision involves choosing ‘variables’, ‘factors’ or
‘indicators’ for which there are data […] But it is also possible, though more difficult,
to think of such issues causally, in terms of the processes and mediations by which
membership of a particular social class, a particular type of educational institution
and particular economic circumstances affects attitudes to education, etc. This could
be incorporated with empirical study of concrete instances of the relationship.
(Sayer 1992:202)
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